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The impact of globalisation on the formulation and 




Singapore’s export-oriented growth strategy has yielded relatively high productivity and GDP growth 
since the mid-1970s. However, it has also increased the country’s susceptibility to external shocks. In 
recent years, the globalisation process has exacerbated these shocks. With rising cross-border 
investment and stronger trade linkages, the business cycles of major industrial countries have become 
more synchronised. At the same time, the increased integration of world capital markets, with higher 
capital mobility and larger volumes of capital flows - particularly private flows - has created the 
potential for large and sudden reversals in such flows. Indeed, the Singapore economy has been hit 
by a series of shocks in close succession since 1997 - the downturn in the global electronics industry 
in 1996-97, the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, the sharp downturn in US IT demand, the events of 
11 September 2001 and, most recently, the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) virus in April 2003. 
Against this backdrop, this paper addresses the challenges posed by increased globalisation on the 
formulation and implementation of Singapore’s monetary policy by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS). Section 2 gives a brief overview of the monetary policy framework of Singapore. 
The issue of monetary policy formulation in the context of the greater volatility in the external 
environment and ongoing structural changes in the economy is taken up in Section 3, while Section 4 
deals with some of the operational challenges posed by the various aspects of globalisation in the 
implementation of monetary policy. Finally, Section 5 argues that the judicious management of 
monetary policy needs to be supported by a framework of consistent macroeconomic and 
microeconomic policies and by strong institutions, in order to effectively meet the challenges of 
globalisation.
2 Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Brief overview of monetary policy in Singapore 
Since 1981, monetary policy in Singapore has been centred on the management of the exchange rate. 
The primary objective has been to promote price stability as a sound basis for sustainable economic 
growth. The framework incorporates the key features of the basket, band and crawl (BBC) framework.
3 
First, the Singapore dollar (SGD) is managed against a basket of currencies of our major trading 
partners and competitors. The various currencies are given different degrees of importance, or 
weights, depending on the extent of Singapore’s trade dependence on that particular country. 
Second, the MAS operates a managed float regime for the SGD. The trade-weighted exchange rate is 
allowed to fluctuate within an undisclosed policy band, rather than kept to a fixed value. 
Third, the exchange rate policy band is periodically reviewed to ensure that it remains consistent with 
the underlying fundamentals of the economy. 
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The choice of the exchange rate as the intermediate target of monetary policy is predicated on the 
openness of the Singaporean economy to trade and capital flows. Total exports and imports are each 
well in excess of 100% of GDP, while exports account for about two thirds of total demand. In addition, 
the import content of expenditures is relatively high at 51%. Changes in the value of the trade-
weighted SGD therefore have a significant influence on inflation and GDP outcomes. 
The trade-weighted exchange rate, or the SGD nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), is as close to 
an ideal intermediate target of monetary policy as we can expect for Singapore. It is relatively 
controllable and has a powerful and stable relationship with price stability, the final target of policy, 
over the medium term. More relevant to the present discussion, Singapore’s monetary policy 
framework has also given the MAS the necessary flexibility to cope with the dynamics of a globalised 
economy, in coping with short-term volatility as well as in avoiding longer-term currency 
misalignments. 
3. Monetary  policy  formulation  in an increasingly globalised economy 
Coping with short-term external shocks 
The integration of international financial markets implies that shocks in one part of the world are 
readily transmitted to another. This poses challenges to monetary policy in Singapore. Nevertheless, 
the framework of the exchange rate-centred monetary policy has allowed us to accommodate to some 
extent the effects of these shocks while insulating the real economy from its potential destabilising 
impact. We highlight two aspects of this. 
First, the basket characteristic of the managed float system has helped to build in some degree of 
flexibility in dampening the volatility in international currency markets, as compared to a situation in 
which the SGD was on a bilateral peg. Table 1 shows that the SGD has been less volatile with respect 
to the other currencies than if it had been pegged to any of the main currencies. For example, if the 
SGD were pegged against the US dollar, the monthly standard deviation against the yen and euro 
would have been 3.33% and 3.23% respectively, instead of 2.90% and 2.88%. 
 
Table 1 
Standard deviation of monthly currency movements since 1981 
In per cent 
Current basket managed float  Hypothetical dollar peg 
NEER SGD/USD  SGD/JPY  SGD/DEM USD/JPY USD/DEM DEM/JPY 
1.46 1.56 2.90 2.88 3.33 3.23 3.04 
 
The volatility of the SGD NEER as measured by its monthly standard deviation has also been 
significantly lower than that of the US dollar or yen. The standard deviation of the SGD NEER was 
1.46% between 1981 Q1 and 2003 Q2, compared to 3.43% for the US dollar and 4.69% for the yen. 
At the same time, movements of the SGD against major currencies, especially the US dollar, have 
also been less volatile than movements among the major currencies. 
Second, our experience has additionally shown that the presence of the exchange rate bands in the 
managed exchange rate float system has served as an effective shock absorber during periods of 
heightened market volatility. In such instances, there may be occasion to widen the band, as was done 
in October 2001 after the terrorist attacks in the United States and during the 1997 Asian crisis. In both 
cases, the bands were subsequently narrowed again when market and economic conditions stabilised. 
In addition, in its six-monthly review of exchange rate policy, the MAS reassesses its monetary policy 
stance to ensure continued relevance to domestic economic conditions, against the backdrop of 
changing developments in the global economy. For example, in July 2001 the MAS shifted its policy 
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appreciation of the exchange rate given the sharp deceleration in growth in Singapore’s main export 
markets, as well as the absence of inflationary pressures into the forecast period. This policy stance 
and its subsequent maintenance into 2002 and 2003 H2 were judged to provide support for the 
economic recovery in a low-inflation environment.
4 
Coping with structural developments 
Over the medium to longer term, the managed float has provided the flexibility for the MAS to reflect 
the evolving global and domestic structural developments in exchange rate policy formulation. The 
MAS continually assesses the path of the exchange rate to ensure that it reflects underlying economic 
conditions. The “crawl” feature of the managed float system thus allows the equilibrium (real) value of 
the exchange rate to reflect changes in economic fundamentals, such as the trend increase in saving 
rates and strong productivity performance in the export sector. In addition, the composition of the 
basket of currencies and their respective weights are also periodically reviewed to incorporate evolving 
trade patterns. Since 1981, the trade-weighted SGD has been on a secularly appreciating trend in 
both nominal and real terms. This partly reflects the structural transformation of the Singapore 
economy over the years, from a predominantly low-skill, labour-intensive base towards greater capital 
and knowledge-intensive activity. 
The MAS firmly believes that in the long run, export competitiveness can only be maintained if firms 
increase productivity, create new products and actively seek out new markets. Thus, it has deliberately 
not used the exchange rate as an instrument to manage Singapore’s export competitiveness. 
Moreover, given that monetary policy affects the economy with long and variable lags, the exchange 
rate policy has a medium-term focus and is not intended for short-term adjustments. The result has 
been a stable SGD, low inflation, confidence in the currency and low interest rates. Where 
fundamental shifts are required to preserve the competitiveness of the economy, the government has 
taken steps to directly reduce wages and other domestic costs, as well as fine-tune various industrial 
policies, rather than place the burden of adjustment on the nominal exchange rate. 
Research work at the MAS as well as the IMF has shown that the real effective exchange rate in 
Singapore has been aligned with the key underlying economic fundamentals. For example, the IMF, 
using an econometric model based on a set of fundamentals, showed that the actual and (estimated) 
equilibrium exchange rates have tracked each other fairly closely.
5 
4.  Globalisation’s challenges for the implementation of monetary policy 
The increasingly globalised landscape has also presented challenges for the MAS in the 
implementation of its monetary policy. In recent years, the size of global capital flows, especially short-
term flows, has increased. For example, the size of portfolio flows as a proportion of foreign direct 
investment has risen from an average of approximately 8% between 1996 and 1997 to about 21% in 
2002. This has had implications for (i) the management of our monetary policy target - the SGD trade-
weighted exchange rate, and (ii) the management of liquidity in the banking system, as explained 
below. 
Challenges to exchange rate management 
To ensure the effective management of the SGD trade-weighted exchange rate, the MAS has 
traditionally relied on three factors. First, the MAS has built up a large pool of official foreign reserves, 
which totalled SGD 143 billion or the equivalent of eight months of imports as at end-2002, to buffer 
any attacks on its currency. Second, it does not disclose the precise width of the bands within which 
                                                       
4  In addition, the MAS recentred the exchange rate band at the prevailing level of the exchange rate in January 2002 and July 
2003. 
5  International Monetary Fund, “Singapore: selected issues”, IMF Staff Country Report, no 99/35, 1999. 266  BIS Papers No 23
 
the SGD NEER is allowed to fluctuate, to avoid drawing a “line in the sand” for speculators to target 
their attacks. Finally, the MAS currently maintains a policy on non-internationalisation of the SGD, 
which essentially restricts the lending of SGD  to non-residents for speculation against the SGD. 
Arguably, as the speed and volume of international capital flows rise, all three factors will be 
increasingly tested. Lending restrictions, like the SGD non-internationalisation policy, will also be 
increasingly undermined by the growth of offshore markets, which provide an alternative means of 
funding for currency speculators. 
In response, some countries have imposed additional restrictions to insulate their economies from 
international capital flows. The MAS has chosen the opposite route, liberalising its SGD 
non-internationalisation policy further. Central to this strategy is the belief that allowing international 
investors and intermediaries to participate more freely in our domestic capital market will deepen the 
SGD currency market and make it more resilient to speculative attacks. Since 1998, the SGD 
non-internationalisation policy has been gradually liberalised. After March 2002, only two restrictions 
remain. First, SGD equity and bond issuers are required to swap or convert their SGD proceeds into 
foreign currency prior to use abroad.
6 Second, Singapore-based financial institutions are not allowed 
to extend SGD credit of more than SGD 5 million to an external financial institution if there are reasons 
to believe that these funds are to be used for speculation against the SGD. 
Challenges to SGD liquidity management 
Being able to mitigate the impact of large capital flows on the exchange rate is only half of the 
equation. The fallout on liquidity in the banking system must also be managed. 
In Singapore, liquidity in the banking system is managed through daily money market operations 
(MMOs). Prior to 1998, the MAS relied solely on foreign exchange swaps and uncollateralised (clean) 
lending/borrowing as tools for its MMOs.
7 Both instruments trade in relatively well developed and deep 
markets, but they may not be adequate to handle large-scale liquidity operations. Foreign exchange 
swaps are generally traded on a next day value basis. Liquidity in same day value swaps is limited, 
especially in the afternoon session. The Singapore dollar’s entry into the Continuous Linked 
Settlement (CLS) system has further sapped liquidity because same day swaps cannot be settled in 
the system. Lending large amounts of funds clean is not desirable as it incurs large credit risks for the 
MAS. For the system as a whole, interbank credit exposures also rise as banks onlend funds from the 
MAS to other banks. 
To enhance the MAS’s capacity for liquidity management, the sale and repurchase (repo) of 
Singapore Government Securities (SGSs) was introduced as an MMO tool in 1998. From 
non-existence, SGS repurchase volumes have experienced a fivefold increase since 2000; more 
encouragingly, the MAS volume as a proportion of the total market volume has fallen. 
Graph 1 
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Since SGS repurchases are traded on a delivery-versus-payment (DVP) basis, they incur much less 
credit risk, both for the MAS and for the system as a whole. But because the market is relatively 
immature, tenures beyond three months are still not well traded. Thus, for longer-term withdrawals or 
injections, the MAS still relies on foreign exchange swaps. In September and October 2003, not unlike 
many Asian economies, Singapore experienced a surge in portfolio inflows. To “mop up” excess 
liquidity, the MAS engaged in about SGD 15 billion of MMO, the equivalent of about 8% of the liability 
base. Of these 39% were in SGS repurchases, 37% in clean borrowing and 24% in foreign exchange 
swaps. 
5.  A multidimensional approach to exchange rate management 
As noted in both Sections 3 and 4, Singapore’s ability to cope with the vagaries and dynamics of an 
increasingly globalised financial market cannot be simply attributed to the judicious choice of 
exchange rate regime and its implementation. Instead, the exchange rate system may be viewed 
simply as a “monetary overlay” on the real economy foundations, and therefore needs to be 
complemented with a framework of consistent macroeconomic and microeconomic policies and strong 
institutions. This view is perhaps succinctly captured by the following quote: 
“… the choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order importance to the 
development of good fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions in producing 
macroeconomic success in emerging market countries. This suggests that less attention 
should be focused on the general question whether a floating or a fixed exchange rate is 
preferable, and more on these deeper institutional arrangements. A focus on institutional 
reforms rather than on the exchange rate regime may encourage emerging market 
countries to be healthier and less prone to the crises that we have seen in recent years.”
8 
Some of the key support factors of relevance to Singapore’s experience are highlighted below. 
First, strong emphasis is placed on running sound and credible macroeconomic policies to avoid the 
build-up of major macro-imbalances in the Singapore economy, which could lead to misalignments in 
the currency and invite speculative attacks. For example, prudent fiscal policy has absolved the MAS 
of the need to finance the government and allowed it to focus on its primary mission of maintaining 
price stability. 
Second, and of equal importance due to Singapore’s small open economy and dependence on 
exports, is the flexibility of product and factor markets to cope with and adjust to shocks arising from 
the currency markets and swings in the terms of trade in world product economies. In particular, the 
labour and wage policies in Singapore have demonstrated significant flexibility in responding to the 
changing market conditions, through the unique harmonious tripartite industrial relationship, involving 
the government, the labour union and the employers. 
Third, it is crucial to develop and strengthen financial systems in order to enhance their robustness to 
shocks. To do so, financial regulators must also consistently upgrade their supervisory capabilities to 
keep pace with financial innovations and the increasing complexity of financial institutions’ activities 
and products. In recognition of this, the MAS undertook a strategic review of its financial sector 
policies in 1997. Measures taken included efforts to develop bond markets, the asset management 
industry and the insurance industry, as well as to open up the domestic banking industry. 
Finally, the MAS has recognised the importance of promoting greater disclosure and transparency to 
foster market discipline and reduce the likelihood of markets overreacting due to a lack of information 
or information asymmetries. For example, for financial markets in general, the MAS has raised bank 
disclosure standards and sought to improve corporate governance. On the monetary policy front, more 
information has been released on websites and in printed publications. One of the recent initiatives 
includes the decision to publish a Monetary Policy Statement soon after each semiannual review of 
exchange policy. The MAS has also published a monograph of its Monetary Policy Operations to 
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provide the public with greater clarity on how monetary policy is implemented. These efforts have 
ensured that the financial markets and the public have a clear understanding and appreciation of the 
MAS monetary policy formulation process and the rationale for the policy stance. 
6. Conclusion 
The technical features of the managed float system have provided the necessary instruments to work 
towards the objective of sustainable non-inflationary growth in the context of the small and open 
nature of the Singapore economy. Furthermore, the MAS maintains robust foreign reserves and has 
broadened the range of money market tools used for its exchange rate management and money 
market operations. However, these conditions are not sufficient, and need to be complemented with 
sound economic judgment, enlightened discretion and constant vigilance in the light of increased 
volatility in both the real economy and the financial markets. In addition, the continued emphasis on 
maintaining strong macroeconomic fundamentals and robust financial institutions, coupled with the 
development of liquid and efficient capital markets, are also crucial underpinnings that would aid the 
successful operation of Singapore’s monetary policy in an increasingly globalised world. 